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INTRODUCTION 
Many federal regulations have direct or indirect effects on employment. Some 
evaluations of U.S. government regulations include estimates of these effects, 
measured as the number of jobs that will be created or lost due to the regulation. 
A literature has emerged that attempts to measure the costs or benefits of these 
employment changes, focusing primarily on foregone earnings for workers who 
experience unemployment or re-employment at different wages (e.g., Couch and 
Placzek 2010, Walker 2013).  
However, the majority of job searches are inherently spatial.1  That is, a work-
er’s job location limits where he can live, and his house location limits where he 
can work.  These constraints link the housing and labor markets in ways that in-
fluence the spatial mobility of the labor force.  For example, according to the 
American Housing Survey2, “new job or job transfer” is the second most fre-
quently cited reason for moving out of a former dwelling.  Likewise, “convenient 
to job” is the most frequently cited reason for selecting a new neighborhood.  
These statistics suggest that it may be important to consider the effects of layoffs 
on spatial mobility.  If an unemployed worker’s best job offer is far from his 
house, then he may decide to move.  If he perceives the quality of life to be lower 
(higher) in his new neighborhood than in his old neighborhood, then he may expe-
                                                 
1 Approximately 75% of U.S. workers report that they spend no time telecommuting (Noonan and Glass, 2012).  
2 The data can be accessed from http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/ahs.html. 
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rience a welfare loss (gain) in addition to any change in earnings.   
The purpose of this article—which is part of a symposium on “Unemploy-
ment, Environmental Regulation, and Benefit-Cost Analysis”3—is to broaden the 
notion of the employment effects of regulations to account for how layoffs affect 
people's decisions about where to live and work. This has potentially important 
welfare implications if people relocate to neighborhoods that they like less or if 
they face longer commutes. We use a new equilibrium sorting model to develop a 
framework for estimating the welfare costs of layoffs caused by regulations that 
accounts for these spatial effects as well as the more typical effects of lost earn-
ings.  
Equilibrium models of residential sorting use the logic of revealed preferences 
to explain how households sort themselves across neighborhoods based on their 
incomes and tastes for housing and amenities provided by those neighborhoods 
(Kuminoff, Smith, and Timmins 2013).  A few recent studies have incorporated 
the interaction between labor market choices and housing choices into this litera-
ture (Kuminoff 2010, Bishop 2011, Mangum 2012). We use the model from Ku-
minoff (2010) to show how an analyst’s estimate of the number of layoffs that 
will be caused by a regulation can be translated into an economic measure of con-
sumer welfare that accounts for the costs of unemployment, changes in job pro-
                                                 
3 The other articles are Smith (2015), which provides an introduction to the symposium; Bartik (2015), which examines the 
social value of job losses and its impact on the overall costs of U.S. environmental regulations; and Rogerson (2015), 
which discusses how dynamic general equilibrium methods used to evaluate macroeconomic policies can be used to evalu-
ate environmental regulations.   
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spects, and changes in where people live and work and how far they commute. 
We apply the model to data on working households in Northern California.  
Our findings suggest that analysts should be wary of interpreting changes in 
workers’ earnings as welfare effects of layoffs or newly created jobs.  Changes in 
earnings may understate or overstate welfare effects.  The direction and magni-
tude of the bias depend on whether the workers who experience layoffs end up 
with housing options, commuting options, job options, and access to local public 
goods that they perceive to be more or less desirable than their original locations. 
We also find that earnings losses are sensitive to business cycle conditions. 
This article occupies a middle ground between Bartik (2015), which presents a 
partial equilibrium model, and Rogerson (2015), which presents a general equilib-
rium model.  Our approach is related to Bartik (2015) in that we both consider the 
costs associated with transitioning from job loss to new employment.  However, 
we focus on the spatial component of this process, while Bartik focuses on factors 
that reduce the value of non-work time.  Both articles consider worker-specific 
factors that might affect the duration of unemployment, such as industry, occupa-
tion, income, age, and house location.  This introduces an important source of 
heterogeneity that is more difficult to address in the general equilibrium models 
considered by Rogerson (2015). In contrast to Rogerson (2015), we do not model 
working households as forward-looking dynamic decision-makers.  Nor do we 
model impacts on firms, adjustments to equilibrium prices or wages, or the wel-
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fare costs of collecting public funds through taxation to pay for unemployment 
insurance.  
In the remainder of this article, we first provide an overview of the equilibri-
um sorting model. Then, using data for working households in Northern Califor-
nia, we demonstrate how the model could be applied.  This is followed by a dis-
cussion of the implications for adapting our framework to consider specific regu-
lations. We conclude with some caveats and suggestions for future research. 
OVERVIEW OF THE SORTING MODEL 
Sorting models are often used to predict the welfare effects of policies that influ-
ence the quality of life by altering the spatial distribution of public goods, such as 
school quality, public safety, open space, or other environmental amenities.  
While most applications assume the policy has no effect on wages or employ-
ment, Kuminoff (2010) models the connection between location decisions in the 
housing and labor markets.  Households are assumed to differ in their job skills 
and in their preferences for local public goods, housing, and a composite private 
good.  Job locations are assumed to differ in their wages and in their commute 
times to the various neighborhoods.  Neighborhoods differ in the public goods 
they provide and in the price of housing.  Each household is assumed to weigh its 
options before choosing the job-house combination that maximizes its utility.   
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We consider a potential regulation that is expected to improve environmental 
quality but at the cost of inducing layoffs for workers in a particular industry and 
geographic area.  For example, a proposed regulation might target the manufac-
turing sector in counties designated as severe nonattainment areas for federal air 
quality standards.  We assume the analyst has an estimate in mind for the number 
of layoffs that will be caused by the regulation.  How would the layoffs affect 
consumer welfare?  The equilibrium sorting approach answers this question using 
four steps.  The first step is to characterize the microeconomic process that led the 
affected households to choose their current jobs and houses (i.e., before the regu-
lation).  The second step is to use information on macroeconomic conditions to 
predict the expected duration of the unemployment spells for the workers who 
lose their jobs.  The third step is to predict where the unemployed workers will 
eventually relocate.  The fourth step is to calculate the change in consumer wel-
fare implied by the wages lost during unemployment and the adjustment costs as-
sociated with relocation.  The remainder of this section describes the four steps in 
more detail4 and then compares the sorting model with a general equilibrium 
model.   
Step 1: Characterizing Workers’ Baseline Job and Housing 
Choices 
                                                 
4 A formal technical presentation of the model appears in Kuminoff, Schoellman, and Timmins (2013). 
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Most Americans live in urban regions with diverse opportunities for employment 
and housing.  Equilibrium sorting models typically focus on a single region (e.g., 
Bayer et al. 2011, Epple and Sieg 1999, Klaiber and Phaneuf 2010, Smith et al. 
2004).  The modeling process begins by dividing the region into housing commu-
nities and job locations.  Communities are sometimes defined using public school 
district boundaries because these areas are sufficiently large to have noticeable 
differences in the price of housing and access to local public goods.  Public goods 
may include services provided through tax revenue, such as school quality, as 
well as environmental amenities influenced by regulatory activity, such as air 
quality.  Job locations are often defined as metropolitan areas (e.g., San Jose, 
Oakland).  Conditional on skill, a worker may be compensated differently in dif-
ferent job locations due to spatial variation in regulation, tax rates, local cost-of-
living adjustments, unionization, and other factors that affect the local demand for 
labor.   
Working households are assumed to have perfect information about the spatial 
landscape (e.g., they are assumed to know the levels of air quality and school 
quality in every school district).  They then evaluate the feasible job-house loca-
tions and select the one that maximizes their utility.  A household’s utility de-
pends on its consumption of private goods (including housing), its access to local 
public goods in its home community, and the amount of time the household’s 
primary earner must spend commuting.  Following one of the main branches of 
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the literature, we use a parametric model for utility that assumes a constant elas-
ticity of substitution (CES) between public and private goods (e.g., Epple and 
Sieg 1999, Sieg et al. 2004, Kuminoff 2010).5  This utility function implicitly de-
fines the labor supply and housing demand functions that underlie the equilibrium 
wage function in the labor market and the equilibrium price function in the hous-
ing market.   
We observe the house prices and local public goods in different communities; 
the wages workers earn in their chosen jobs; and the commute times between 
communities and job locations. Our econometric model estimates the preferences 
of households for private consumption and public goods, and the skills of workers 
that rationalize these observed choices and prices as equilibrium outcomes in the 
market.  This process involves characterizing each worker’s job opportunities.   
The primary earner of each household is assumed to possess skills that deter-
mine the wages he would earn in each job location. Some skills, such as a work-
er’s education or occupation, can be measured using U.S. Census public use mi-
cro data files.6  We can use these measured skills to predict the worker’s wage in 
each job location.  The difference between the predicted and actual wage at the 
                                                 
5 Formally, the indirect utility for household i from living in community j and working in labor market k is defined as 
𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝑖�𝑞𝑖𝑖�𝜌 + �𝑒𝑒𝑒 �𝑦𝑖𝑖1−𝜈−11−𝜈 − 𝜙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑖� 𝑒𝑒𝑒 �−𝛽𝑝𝑗𝜂+1−11+𝜂 ��𝜌�1𝜌, where 𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝑖1𝑔1𝑖 + ⋯+ 𝛾𝑖𝑖−1𝑔𝑖−1𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖 is a linear 
index of local public goods provided by community j as perceived by household i; 𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the income earned when the pri-
mary earner of the household works in labor market k; 𝑡𝑖𝑖 is a measure of the time required to commute between j and k; 𝑒𝑖 
is a measure of the price of housing, and 𝛼,𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜉, 𝜂, 𝜈,𝜙, and 𝜌 are preference parameters recovered during the estimation.  
See Kuminoff (2010) for details. 
6 The files are available from http://www.census.gov/acs/www/data_documentation/public_use_microdata_sample/  
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worker’s chosen job location reveals the importance of the worker’s skills that are 
not measured in the Census.  Similarly, information on housing prices, household 
income, and access to local public goods is used to infer the strength of a house-
hold’s preferences for public and private goods.  For example, all else constant, a 
household that chooses to spend a larger fraction of its income in order to live in a 
community with good air quality is revealed to have relatively strong preferences 
for air quality.7   
Step 2: Predicting the Expected Duration of Unemployment Spells 
We mimic the experience of losing a job by removing the primary earner’s cur-
rent job location from his set of feasible locations.  Forcing unemployed workers 
to work in a new metropolitan region allows us to evaluate the potential for spa-
tial migration in the labor market to influence the welfare effects of layoffs.8   
The transition to a new job takes time.  The worker must prepare a resume, 
search for vacancies, and go through interviews.9  The probability that a newly 
unemployed worker will find a job within a given amount of time can be modeled 
using the actual job-finding experiences of recently unemployed workers in the 
                                                 
7 By allowing working households to have heterogeneous preferences and skills, our model generalizes the Rosen (1979) 
and Roback (1982) model of equilibrium in the housing and labor markets, which assumes that working households are 
homogeneous. 
8 We assume that when a worker is looking for a job, he collects unemployment insurance, which is consistent with current 
U.S. policy. 
9 If a prospective job is located far away, the worker may also choose to search for housing simultaneously. 
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same industry.10  Of course, the duration of unemployment may also vary with 
macroeconomic conditions.  More specifically, it will tend to be shorter during an 
economic expansion and longer during a recession. 
Step 3: Predicting the Worker’s New Job and Housing Location 
Choices 
After removing a worker’s current job location from his set of feasible locations, 
we use his calibrated utility function to predict which of the remaining job-house 
locations would maximize his household’s utility.  Then we assign the worker to 
the corresponding metro area.  The worker’s new job may be in a different indus-
try, but his occupation is assumed to be unchanged.  This allows us to match each 
worker to the wages paid to other workers with similar training.11  Whether the 
worker’s wage rises or falls at his new job also depends on his skills identified in 
step 1.  After moving to the new job location, the worker may choose to continue 
to live in the community where his previous job was located.  However, if the re-
quired commute time induces the worker to move to a different community, then 
the change in his utility will depend on his household’s preferences concerning 
local public goods relative to the public goods provided by the new community.  
                                                 
10 This is reported in the Current Population Survey.  The data can be accessed at: 
http://www.census.gov/cps/data/http://www.census.gov/cps/data/  
11 In practice, we define occupations using 5-digit codes from the Standard Occupational Classification system.  For exam-
ple, the 5-digit SOC codes distinguish between five types of social scientists: economists, market and survey researchers, 
psychologists, sociologists, and urban and regional planners.   
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A household may prefer the public goods provided by the new community or the 
household’s income may rise at the primary earner’s new job, but both cannot oc-
cur simultaneously.  This is because the model assumes that utility must decline 
when a household’s preferred location is removed from its choice set.  
There are four caveats to our predictions concerning the worker’s new job and 
housing location choices.  First, the model focuses exclusively on the primary 
earner’s contribution to household income.  All other sources of income are as-
sumed to be fixed, including the wages of any secondary earners in each house-
hold.12  Second, the model does not allow unemployed workers to move to lower-
skill jobs in the same metro area (e.g., a machinist cannot work as a cashier).13  
This is because the model does not identify a worker’s second best job offer in his 
current job location.14  Thus, we consider two extreme scenarios—a “best-case” 
scenario for the worker in which he ultimately finds a new job at the same wage 
as his old job and in the same metro area as his old job, and a “worst-case” sce-
nario in which the worker finds a new job in a different metro area where he is 
paid less and/or has to move to a neighborhood with a lower quality of life.  These 
two scenarios define upper and lower bounds, respectively, on the welfare conse-
quences of choosing to move to a lower-skill lower-pay job in the same metro ar-
                                                 
12 In order to consistently predict how the incomes of secondary earners would adjust, the model would need to be extend-
ed to depict bargaining within the household.  
13 This could be particularly important when considering the issue of owners v. renters.  Owners may face bigger moving 
costs and might be willing to accept lower paying jobs to avoid leaving their homes. 
14 As part of a sensitivity analysis summarized in the appendix, we show how the model could be calibrated to allow work-
ers to move to lower paying jobs in the same location if the analyst is willing to make an assumption about the reduction in 
wages at the new job. 
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ea as the old job.15  Third, the model does not include search costs.  If there were 
search costs, then it would be possible for a laid off worker—who is now forced 
to search—to find a higher paying job.  Fourth, because a household’s heteroge-
neous preference and skill parameters are estimated in step 1, rather than observed 
directly, there is some uncertainty in the model’s prediction for a particular 
household’s new job and house locations.  Thus, as discussed in the next step, we 
report welfare effects as averages by household type (e.g., the average of welfare 
measures calculated for all over-40 workers who lose their jobs in the manufactur-
ing sector in the Oakland metro area). 
Step 4: Calculating the Change in Consumer Welfare 
For simplicity, we assume that layoffs and any changes in environmental quality 
are sufficiently small to leave housing prices and wages unaffected.  Thus, the 
change in consumer welfare can be measured using the partial equilibrium con-
cept of equivalent variation (EV).  We define EV as the amount of annual income 
one would have to give (or take from) a household before implementation of the 
regulation to make them as well off as they would be after the regulation, given 
the duration of the primary earner’s unemployment spell, the wage at his new job, 
and any adjustments to the household’s quality of life.   
                                                 
15 The reason the “worst-case” scenario gives a lower bound is because a utility-maximizing worker who chooses to remain 
in the same metro area at a lower paying job must be at least as well off from that choice as he would be from choosing to 
move to his best job offer in a different metro area.   
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Because the model is inherently static, it assumes that each worker's next job 
is his second-best choice, without considering any intervening or temporary jobs.  
Likewise, the model assumes that workers earn their new salaries immediately, 
without considering any initial period of lower salary or higher salary growth.  
The lack of dynamics also complicates the treatment of unemployment spells.  
For simplicity, we convert the wages lost during the worker’s unemployment spell 
into an annuity, using the worker’s expected lifespan and an interest rate that 
matches the cost of borrowing on a 30-year fixed rate mortgage.  Intuitively, we 
are assuming that the household finances its consumption during the unemploy-
ment spell by borrowing against its house, thus spreading the temporary wage 
shock across the worker’s expected lifespan.        
Some workers who find new jobs may be underemployed.  More specifically, 
the worker’s hours worked are assumed to be fixed, but his second-best job option 
may be in an industry that does not allow him to fully utilize his occupational 
skills.16  This loss of industry-specific or job-specific human capital may cause 
the worker’s wage to decline.         
Comparison with a General Equilibrium Model  
Compared to a conventional general equilibrium (GE) model of the economy, our 
                                                 
16 We may understate the potential for underemployment by not allowing workers to change occupations.  It would be 
interesting to know how many workers who lose their jobs because of regulation actually do change occupations. 
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sorting framework puts more emphasis on understanding the distribution of heter-
ogeneous wage effects and welfare effects experienced by workers, and less em-
phasis on aggregating these effects.  For example, we can investigate the extent to 
which wage effects and welfare effects vary across working households based on 
demographic characteristics we can observe (e.g., income, occupation, industry) 
and estimated parameters that represent unobserved features of their human capi-
tal and preferences for public goods.  The sorting model also allows us to consider 
the role of space—i.e., that changes in earnings and public goods may be con-
veyed to households through spatial adjustment.  In contrast, most GE models 
lack a spatial dimension.   
However, the flexibility allowed by our sorting model also comes at a cost.  
First, while it depicts interrelated behavior in multiple markets, the sorting model 
is a static framework that excludes GE feedback mechanisms.  For example, if a 
particular regulation were to induce enough people to move, their migration pat-
terns could lead to adjustments in the equilibrium housing price function, the 
wage function, commute times, and the provision of local public goods which, in 
turn, would feed back into welfare measures.  In order to predict these adjust-
ments with the sorting model we would first need to define the demand for labor, 
the supply of housing, and the production functions for each endogenous public 
good.  Bayer and Timmins (2005) demonstrate that models with endogenous pub-
lic goods can generate multiple equilibria, complicating ex ante analysis of pro-
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spective policies.  In contrast, GE models often obtain unique equilibria by as-
suming households are homogeneous.    
Second, in contrast to most GE models, in the sorting model, the prices of pri-
vate goods are assumed to be unaffected by shocks to the housing and labor mar-
kets.  Moreover, the lack of an explicit model of the firm or government means 
that we cannot construct measures of producer surplus, social welfare, or the 
deadweight loss from unemployment insurance schemes.  Finally, unlike the 
broad class of dynamic stochastic GE models used in macroeconomics (e.g., Rog-
erson 2015) our sorting framework does not allow us to predict the adjustment 
path to a new equilibrium.  Overall, these limitations suggest that the sorting 
framework is most appropriate for evaluating regulations that affect a small share 
of workers in a particular industry and study region. We provide an example in 
the next section. 
APPLYING THE MODEL TO LAYOFFS IN NORTH-
ERN CALIFORNIA 
To demonstrate the potential importance of spatial migration for the welfare 
effects of layoffs, we build a “layoff simulator” for Northern California and use it 
to predict the wage effects and welfare effects of layoffs.  To focus on modeling 
the effects of layoffs, we do not consider a particular regulation and do not model 
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changes in environmental quality.  Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we 
explain how Kuminoff (2010) calibrated the microeconomic sorting model to 
characterize the job and housing location choices made by working households in 
Northern California.  Second, we predict the likely duration of unemployment 
spells that would be experienced by workers at different stages of the macroeco-
nomic business cycle. Third, we summarize how our estimates for wage effects 
and welfare effects of layoffs vary across households according to their demo-
graphic characteristics and job locations. 
Calibrating the Model to Working Households in Northern Cali-
fornia 
First, we calibrated the model to Northern California’s two main population cen-
ters—the San Francisco and Sacramento consolidated metropolitan statistical are-
as.17  We defined housing communities by dividing the region into 122 unified 
school districts and 8 job locations based on the region’s 8 primary metropolitan 
statistical areas—PMSAs (see Figure 1).  The population is concentrated around 
the San Francisco Bay and the city of Sacramento (as indicated by the density of 
census tracts in the left map in Figure 1).  The set of possible location choices is 
defined by 268 community-PMSA combinations that, together, account for 99% 
                                                 
17 This region contains approximately 9 million people, or 3% of the U.S. population.   
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of the working population.18   
 
Housing Prices 
Housing prices were calculated from micro data on housing sales recorded by 
county assessors between 1995 and 2005.  These data were used to calculate an 
index of community-specific housing prices using a procedure described in Sieg 
et al. (2002).  The index ranges from 1.00 to 6.51, and its distribution is consistent 
with the conventional wisdom that housing is particularly expensive in the San 
Francisco Bay Area. 
 
Air Quality 
Air quality is measured using concentrations of ground level ozone.  The 
right-side map in Figure 1 shows the locations of 210 monitoring stations, which 
are overlaid on public school districts.  Community-specific measures were con-
structed by first assigning to each house the ozone measure recorded at the nearest 
monitoring station, and then taking an average over all of the houses in the com-
munity.19  We repeated this process for 1999, 2000, and 2001, and then averaged 
the results.  The final measure of air quality ranges from 0.031 (parts per million) 
in the highest air quality community to 0.106 in the lowest.   
                                                 
18 The criterion used to select job/housing location combinations is that they must account for at least 500 working house-
holds (0.02% of the working population).  This effectively excluded multiple-hour commutes between distant locations.   
19 The exact ozone measure used is the average of the top 30 1-hour daily maximum readings recorded at each monitoring 
station during the course of a year.   
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School Quality 
School quality is defined using California’s Academic Performance Index 
(API), a composite index of standardized test scores, weighted across all subjects 
and grade levels.  For each community, a three-year average API was constructed 
by weighting the score of each school in the community by its number of students 
from 1999-2001.  The resulting measure ranges from 528 to 941.  A set of com-
munity-specific dummy variables are used to capture the composite effect of all 
other localized amenities on household location choices. 
 
Households and their Housing Location Choices 
Finally, a sample of micro data on households and their location choices were 
drawn from the U.S. 2000 Census of Population and Housing.  Key variables in-
clude house location, household income, and the primary earner’s job location, 
occupation, industry, wage income, commute time, gender, age, race, and years of 
education.20  We assumed that if a worker were to move to a different job-house 
location, his counterfactual commute time would be the average commute time 
observed for that location.21       
                                                 
20 We used the 5% micro data sample. Occupation is defined using the Standard Occupational Classification system.  In-
dustry is defined using the North American Industrial Classification System.  Job and house locations are defined in the 
Census data as public use microdata areas (PUMA).  In most cases, there is an exact mapping from PUMAs to PMSAs and 
unified school districts.  In cases where PUMA boundaries overlap with school district boundaries, we assigned households 
to communities based on the assumption that people are uniformly distributed across PUMAs. 
21 For additional detail on the data and an explanation of the econometric methods used, see Kuminoff (2010). 
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Defining the Macroeconomic Conditions 
Next, we calibrated the model to reflect the duration of unemployment spells ob-
served in the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS)22 at different stages of the 
business cycle.  The CPS provides monthly data on the labor market status of a 
sample of approximately 60,000 Americans.  From these data we constructed a 
subsample of workers age 16 or older who were unemployed between January 
2002 and February 2012.23  Then, following Shimer (2005, 2012), we constructed 
an approximation of the job finding rate (𝜔𝑠,𝑡), which indicates the share of work-
ers who were unemployed at date t but found work within s weeks of that date.24   
We calculate 𝜔𝑠,𝑡 by industry nationwide for a few key time periods.  We do 
not consider geographic variation because job-finding rates for unemployed 
workers in the San Francisco-Sacramento area are very similar to those for the 
nation as a whole.  There are larger differences in job-finding rates by industry.  
However, the variations in job-finding rates by geographic area and industry are 
outweighed by the variation over the course of the business cycle.   
Thus, the graphs in Figure 2 show job-finding rates by industry for workers 
who initially became unemployed in August 2006, January 2008, and December 
                                                 
22 The data can be accessed at: http://www.census.gov/cps/data/http://www.census.gov/cps/data/ 
23 We focus on this time period because the industry classifications were consistent over time, enabling us to construct 
industry-specific job finding rates.   
24 Formally, given the total number of workers unemployed at a date t, 𝑢𝑡, and the number unemployed for more than s 
weeks at date t+s, 𝑢𝑡+𝑠𝑠 , we can approximate the job finding rate (𝜔𝑠,𝑡) as:  𝜔𝑠,𝑡 = 1 − 𝑢𝑡+𝑠𝑠 𝑢𝑡⁄  . 
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2009, which reflect “expansion”, “normal”, and “recession” labor markets.  These 
months had the highest, median, and lowest job-finding rates, respectively, in our 
CPS sample.  Figure 2 clearly indicates that the differences in job-finding rates 
over the business cycle are much larger than the differences by industry, and that 
they persist strongly for at least two years.25   
Our findings are consistent with the earlier work of Hall (2006) and Shimer 
(2012), who show that variation in the job-finding rate over the business cycle 
explains most of the fluctuations in unemployment; and Șahin et al. (2012), who 
show that little of the variation in aggregate unemployment can be explained by 
variation across geographic regions or industries/occupations. Because variation 
over the business cycle and the unemployed worker’s prior industry seem to be 
the most important channels, our analysis focuses on these.  This allows us to 
evaluate whether aggregate economic conditions have a significant impact on the 
estimated welfare costs of job loss from environment regulations.   
Summary of Predicted Wage Effects and Welfare Effects of 
Layoffs 
The results of our simulation exercise for Northern California suggest that the net 
reduction in earnings experienced by a worker who loses his job may significantly 
                                                 
25 Although the CPS indicates that workers should be able to report almost arbitrarily long unemployment spells, we find 
that almost no workers report spells longer than two years, and that the maximum duration is 124 weeks. Thus, we truncate 
unemployment duration at two years. 
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understate the reduction in welfare experienced by that worker’s household.  In 
our simulations, the workers who remain in the same houses after losing their jobs 
tend to experience longer commutes after they relocate to new jobs.  Moreover, 
the workers who move to new housing communities that are closer to their new 
jobs tend to consume (housing, amenity) bundles that they perceive to be inferior 
to the bundles at their original locations.  The associated reductions in quality of 
life can substantially affect (and even dominate) the welfare loss that a household 
experiences when the primary earner is laid off. We find that the importance of 
reductions in quality of life relative to reductions in earnings varies systematically 
with household demographics and with workers’ industries and job locations.  
 
Aggregate Results 
Table 1 presents our aggregate results concerning the wage effects and welfare 
effects of layoffs.26  As shown in Panel A, the wages lost per worker due to tem-
porary unemployment (i.e., during the unemployment spell) ranges from an aver-
age of $15,234 in our expansion scenario, which has a 4.5 month mean unem-
ployment duration, to an average of $30,815 in our recession scenario, which has 
a 9.4 month mean unemployment duration (see rows 1 and 2).  Converting these 
figures to annuities using the number of expected life years remaining for the 
                                                 
26 All figures in the table are based on iteratively “laying off”, one at a time, individuals drawn from a random 1-in-10 
sample of Northern California households using the Census Bureau’s household weights.   
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worker and an interest rate of 0.07,27 we find that the annualized wage loss from 
temporary unemployment ranges from $1,231 to $2,492 (row 3). 
Panel B reports the average difference in annual salary between workers’ new 
utility maximizing jobs and their old jobs.  We consider two scenarios for how 
layoffs affect employment opportunities.  The first row summarizes the best out-
come for workers, in which being fired does not diminish their job opportunities.  
That is, at the end of a worker’s unemployment spell, he is simply rehired at his 
old job (or hired at an identical job in the same location), and there is no change in 
the worker’s salary.  The second row reports the change in wages when all work-
ers are forced to move to their second-best job locations.  We would expect the 
average worker to be paid less due to a loss of job-specific or industry-specific 
human capital.  Indeed, annual wages decrease by nearly $4,000 for the average 
worker.  This prediction is consistent with evidence from ex post studies of both 
mass layoffs in general (Couch and Placzek 2010) and layoffs caused specifically 
by environmental regulation (Walker 2013).  The standard deviation on the 
change in wage (shown in parentheses) is more than three times the mean, in part, 
because 38% of workers experience wage increases.  The workers who experience 
wage increases also experience a lower quality of life due to increased commute 
times or having moved to a less desirable neighborhood.  
Finally, Panel C reports the expected equivalent variation (i.e., the average 
                                                 
27 Expected life years remaining is based on Center for Disease Control life tables for the year 2000, and the interest rate 
matches the 1995-2005 average interest rate on a fixed rate 30-year home loan.   
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change in household welfare).28  In the “normal” scenario, for example, the range 
of predictions for expected EV per household per year ranges from -$1,617 under 
the scenario where the worker is rehired at an identical job (row 1) to -$7,300 in 
the scenario where the worker has to move to his second best job location (row 2).  
In the first case, the state of the business cycle is very important for welfare 
measurement, with a 100% difference in EV between the recession and expansion 
scenarios.  In contrast, the state of the business cycle is relatively less important 
when workers have to relocate.  In that case, the measures of EV are driven by 
changes in salary at the workers’ new jobs and changes in utility from moving to 
different housing communities and different commuting options.  
  
Demographic Groups 
Table 2 disaggregates the results by demographic group.  For brevity, we only 
report results for “normal” business cycle conditions here.  We find that earnings 
losses tend to (i) be larger for men relative to women, (ii) increase with experi-
ence, and (iii) increase with age. Thus, our qualitative predictions about the 
changes in earnings due to layoffs are consistent with the stylized facts about de-
mographic variation in the income effects of layoffs summarized by Mansur and 
Posner (2012).  Our intra-urban sorting model is not constrained to reproduce any 
                                                 
28 Recall that EV is the annual payment we would have to make to a group of workers each year for the rest of their lives in 
order to compensate them for the loss of their most preferred and initially chosen job-house pair.  Expected EV is calculat-
ed by integrating over the distribution of unemployment spells for each business cycle scenario.   
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of these results, but the fact that it does reproduce them when applied to the data 
for Northern California provides some preliminary support for the model’s validi-
ty.  The results also suggest that earnings losses tend to increase with education 
levels and tend to be larger for homeowners than for renters. 
On average, lost earnings are responsible for about three-quarters of the over-
all loss in welfare. This can be seen by dividing the expected change in real wages 
(column 3) by the expected EV, (column 4).  The remainder of the welfare loss is 
due to the fact that when the average worker makes a job switch, he chooses ei-
ther a longer commute or moves to a community with a combination of house 
prices and local public goods that he finds less desirable (i.e., there a decline in 
the worker’s quality of life).  The relative importance of the latter effect varies by 
gender, age, education, years of experience in the labor force, and homeownership 
because of differences in the locations these different types of workers chose ini-
tially, as well as differences in their preferences and skills.   
Earnings and Welfare Effects by Location 
Table 3 reports the earnings losses (column 1) and overall welfare losses due 
to layoffs (column 2) according to a household’s original job location.  It also re-
ports the fraction of households that move to a new housing community (column 
3) and the fraction of households that experience increases in specific amenities 
when they move to their new communities (columns 4-8). The table illustrates 
why the earnings losses in column 1 tend to understate the welfare losses in col-
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umn 2 (as they do here for seven of the eight job locations). The clearest example 
of this bias is for workers who lose jobs in Sacramento. Sacramento is a relatively 
low-wage area, so workers who lose jobs there experience relatively modest earn-
ings losses when they relocate (see column 1). However, these earnings losses 
represent just one-third of their total welfare loss (see column 2), with the remain-
der of the welfare loss accounted for by changes in living conditions (see columns 
4-8). Sacramento offers a combination of house prices and amenities that are low 
relative to other communities in the Bay Area. By choosing to live in Sacramento 
initially, households revealed that they preferred this type of community (i.e., that 
they put a lower weight on public goods and a higher weight on private consump-
tion). The results indicate that when workers in these households find new em-
ployment elsewhere in the Bay Area, 78% of them face a longer commute, 72% 
move to a new community with lower school quality, and 68% pay more for 
housing, all of which lower their welfare. 
The Sacramento example also illustrates a more general implication of the 
sorting model.  The workers who choose to live in “dirty” areas based on relative-
ly weak preferences for environmental quality may experience disproportionate 
welfare losses if they are effectively forced by a regulation to move to “clean” 
areas where housing prices and amenities are both higher.  This is especially im-
portant when considering policies that establish minimum standards on environ-
mental quality, because such policies effectively target the dirtiest areas. 
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In contrast to the Sacramento case, earnings losses tend to closely approxi-
mate welfare losses for workers who initially worked in the high-wage areas of 
San Francisco and San Jose. This is because these workers tended to move to are-
as where they traded off lower air quality and amenities for lower house prices. 
Although workers generally preferred their former communities, the average cost 
of this move is smaller than for workers who initially worked in Sacramento. 
 
Results for Other Subgroups 
Finally, it is worth noting that our simulation model can be used to examine 
the implications of job losses for any subgroup of the population that can be iden-
tified on the basis of worker and/or household characteristics reported in the Cen-
sus PUMS data.  Subgroups of interest might include the worker’s specific indus-
try and occupation, the household’s income, house location, and the presence of 
children in the household.29    The next section considers how future evaluations 
of proposed regulations could use our layoff simulator to examine the potential 
wage and welfare effects for a small subset of workers in the specific industries, 
occupations, and metro areas targeted by those regulations.   
                                                 
29 Appendix Table A1 provides an example of this by summarizing the expected EV for house-
holds where the primary earner works in the manufacturing sector, by the worker’s age and origi-
nal work location. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR EVALUATING SPECIFIC 
REGULATIONS 
The simulation results presented in the previous section suggest that earnings 
losses, welfare losses, and the difference between them should not be treated as 
constants that can simply be transferred from one environmental regulation to an-
other.  As we have shown, these statistics vary with the demographic profiles of 
the workers who lose their jobs, including the industries where they work and the 
geographic locations of their jobs and houses.  Thus, the welfare effects of envi-
ronmental regulations will generally depend on where the regulations are imple-
mented.  This means that analysts must follow several steps in order to use this 
type of simulation model to evaluate the welfare effects of a specific regulation.  
 
Define Demographic Profiles of Laid Off Workers 
First, the analyst would need to define the demographic profiles of the work-
ers who are laid off. If the evaluation is conducted ex ante, then the layoffs could 
be based on an estimate from a regulatory agency.30  If the evaluation is conduct-
ed ex post, then the laid off workers could be identified using data and methods 
similar to those in Kahn and Mansur (2013), Walker (2013), and Curtis (2013). In 
                                                 
30 Masur and Posner (2012, Table 2) provide examples of agencies that have estimated job losses.  Alternatively, one could 
attempt to develop a new spatially explicit model of firm sorting to predict which industries will be affected and where (in 
space) the layoffs will occur.  
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this case, the sorting model would be used to convert these estimates for employ-
ment effects into welfare measures.  
 
Define New Job-House Opportunities 
Assuming the analyst knows who will be affected by an environmental regula-
tion, the next step would be to develop a spatial sorting model that describes the 
affected workers’ new job-house opportunities. We have illustrated how this can 
be done, but there is considerable room for refinement of our model.  For exam-
ple, our baseline model did not allow workers to adjust the number of hours they 
work, or to look for jobs outside of their SOC 5-digit broad occupation category 
(e.g., education administrator, detective and criminal investigator, cook).31  
 
Incorporate Other Costs and Jobs 
If data on moving costs, job search costs, and job postings are available, then 
it is possible to refine the sorting model to incorporate this information. To illus-
trate how this could be done, we have analyzed the sensitivity of our baseline re-
sults for Northern California’s manufacturing sector to the inclusion of moving 
costs and job offers in the worker’s current PMSA (see Appendix Table 2).  Spe-
cifically, we assume the annualized cost of moving to a new house is $681.  This 
                                                 
31 We also ignored moving costs and did not allow laid off workers to search for different jobs in the same labor market.  
This means that our model is likely to overstate spatial migration.   
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figure is based on Bieri, Kuminoff, and Pope’s (2013) estimate for the annualized 
physical and financial cost of moving within the Sacramento-San Francisco re-
gion.  We assume that every laid off worker has the option to move to a new job 
in the same PMSA but with a wage reduction that ranges from 3% to 15%.32  We 
find that migration, expected welfare losses, and the expected change in real wag-
es all increase with the percentage reduction in wages.   
  For example, when workers in manufacturing jobs are assumed to face a 
wage reduction of 6% at their 2nd best job offer in their current PMSA, the aver-
age NPV of their lifetime wage reduction is equivalent to 121% of the current 
wage (see Appendix Table 2).  This is close to the 123% reduction that Walker 
(2013) observes for manufacturing workers in four states following implementa-
tion of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.  Interestingly, the share of workers 
that the sorting model predicts will move to jobs in new PMSAs (42%) is also 
close to the share that Walker observes moving to jobs in new counties (40%).33  
Thus, extending our model to include moving costs and job offers in the same 
PMSA produces results for migration patterns and earnings reductions that are 
similar to estimates in the literature.  In principle, this exercise could be adapted 
to solve for the percentage reduction in wages that would be required for the 
model to approximately match the migration patterns and earnings reductions ob-
                                                 
32 This could mean the worker finds a new job at a lower wage in the same PMSA or that the worker is able to negotiate a 
wage reduction at their old job in order to avoid a layoff.  The former mechanism appears to dominate in Walker’s (2013) 
analysis of the Clean Air Act’s employment effects in four states.  
33 Four of the PMSAs in our study region include a single county, two PMSAs include two counties, and two include three 
counties.  
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served in the data.  However, the ideal calibration would also need to be adapted 
to the relevant geographic area and time period.   
CONCLUSIONS 
Over the past decade, full-employment equilibrium models of residential sort-
ing have increasingly been used to evaluate the benefits of existing and proposed 
environmental regulations in the United States (Sieg et al. 2004, Smith et al. 2004, 
Walsh 2007, Tra 2010, and Klaiber and Phaneuf 2010).  We have demonstrated 
that these models can be extended to incorporate the welfare effects of job layoffs.   
Our “layoff simulator” for Northern California’s eight major metropolitan areas 
predicts that the average worker’s annual earnings would decline by $5,553 if he 
were to suddenly lose his job during a normal state of the economy and relocate to 
a new job in one of the seven other metro areas.  Approximately 70% of this re-
duction is due to a loss of job-specific human capital.  The other 30% comes from 
wages lost during his unemployment spell.  Our layoff simulator predicts that 
earnings losses account for only 76% of the change in welfare. The remaining 
welfare losses come from a job loss effect that has thus far received little attention 
in the literature: the fact that even after workers find new jobs, they often face a 
tradeoff between moving to a less desirable community with, for example, lower 
air quality, or remaining in their current community and having a longer com-
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mute.  Our model also predicts that the relative importance of lost earnings and 
changed housing-commuting options varies systematically across workers accord-
ing to their age, experience, occupation, industry, job skill, preferences, and geo-
graphic location.  Thus, our findings suggest that spatial migration has the poten-
tial to be of first order importance for evaluating the welfare effects of layoffs. 
We also find that the state of the economy is important for adjustment costs.  Ex-
pected earnings losses are approximately 7% lower during an expansion and 16% 
higher during a recession.   
Our results suggest that policy analysts should be wary of interpreting changes 
in workers’ earnings as welfare effects of layoffs or newly created jobs.  Specifi-
cally, the change in earnings fails to account for the welfare implications of: (i) 
changes in commute time; (ii) changes in housing expenditures; and (iii) changes 
in access to local public goods.  As an extreme case, consider a worker who, prior 
to a regulation, chose to work at a low paying job in order to live in a desirable 
community.  If the worker loses his job, his next best alternative may be to move 
to a less desirable community near a higher paying job.  If the worker’s unem-
ployment spell is brief, his annualized income could increase despite the fact that 
he is clearly worse off from the move.  Our point is that changes in earnings may 
understate or overstate welfare effects.   
Overall, we are optimistic about the potential for using sorting models to 
evaluate the benefits and costs of environmental regulations that may result in 
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layoffs.  However, there are limitations to these models and further research and 
refinements will be needed before they are ready to be widely used for policy 
analysis.   
 
Model Limitations and Caveats 
As with all revealed preference models of housing and labor markets, our spe-
cific predictions for the welfare costs of job losses depend on assumptions about 
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences and skills among workers and house-
holds.  Our analysis has several other limitations, which suggests that our results 
should be interpreted with caution.  More specifically, we have ignored forward-
looking behavior and dynamics.  Emerging research suggests that these issues are 
likely to be collectively important for welfare measurement in the sorting litera-
ture (e.g. Bishop 2011; Bayer et al. 2011).  In particular, being underwater on a 
mortgage (i.e., owing the bank more than the market value of a house) could 
make it even more costly for a homeowner to move during a recession, which 
could reduce mobility and increase the welfare consequences of job loss.  In prin-
ciple, this could be addressed by introducing joint job and housing choices into a 
dynamic model that treats housing as an investment asset (see e.g., Bayer et al. 
2011).  
Second, our description of the household adjustment process is simple relative 
to some articles in the empirical sorting literature (Kuminoff, Smith, and Timmins 
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2013) in that we consider a hypothetical policy that is small enough that it will not 
induce feedback effects of the magnitude that make the general equilibrium fea-
tures of Rogerson’s (2015) model important.  For some policies, this may be a fair 
approximation of reality.  For others, it will clearly be insufficient.  For example, 
extremely high unemployment could cause housing prices to fall.  This might 
benefit renters, while reducing the value of homeowners’ assets and increasing 
their probability of foreclosure. 
Third, our Northern California model is limited in its geographic scope, cover-
ing only 3% of the U.S. population.  Moreover, the basic idea of spatial sorting 
suggests that the welfare effects of job loss may differ from one metro area to an-
other.  This suggests there may be a systematic bias associated with using esti-
mates for wage effects or welfare effects from one geographic area (e.g., a few 
counties or states) to draw conclusions about wage effects or welfare effects in a 
different geographic area. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
 
The sorting literature is an active area of research. Moving forward, one prom-
ising approach to using sorting models to systematically assess the effects of pro-
spective regulations would be to develop “regulation simulators” for several met-
ropolitan regions, similar to what we have done for Northern California.  A sec-
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ond approach would be to extend the recent work of Bayer, Khan, and Timmins 
(2011), Bayer et al. (2011), Bieri, Kuminoff, and Pope (2013), Bishop (2011), 
Kennan and Walker (2011), and Mangum (2012) by developing a national sorting 
model that integrates unemployment, moving costs, dynamics, imperfect infor-
mation, and heterogeneous skills and preferences for amenities.   
Finally, a key area for future research would be to develop direct evidence on 
the migration patterns and job transitions of workers who lose their jobs due spe-
cifically to environmental regulations.  Although aggregate migration data are 
widely available, it is not clear whether migration patterns systematically differ 
for workers who lose their jobs.  Nor is it clear whether the average unemploy-
ment duration is systematically different for workers who lose their jobs due to 
environmental regulation relative to those who lose their jobs due to all causes.  
Walker (2013) provides some initial evidence on migration patterns by tracking 
the job locations of workers in the manufacturing industry who relocated within 
four states, finding that more than 40% of workers who were laid off moved to 
new jobs in different counties.  However, it is not clear how many of these work-
ers moved to new houses.  Similarly, the work of Mangum (2012), who developed 
an “islands” model of metropolitan areas with unemployment, raises the question 
of whether unemployed workers move to new metro areas before or after finding 
a job there.  More generally, if the share of unemployed workers who move to 
new housing communities and labor markets is small, then a model of only labor 
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market sorting might be more useful than a dual-market model of sorting across 
the housing and labor markets.  If the share is large but most movers stay within 
the same metro area, then a regional model of both markets—similar to the one 
we have presented here—may be the most appropriate approach.  Moreover, if the 
share of workers who move cross-country is large, then the development of a na-
tional sorting model may be the most important and productive direction for fu-
ture research. 
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Figure 1: San Francisco and Sacramento Consolidated Metro Areas.   
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2: Cumulative Job Finding Probability, by Industry and Business Cycle 
 
Note: These graphs display national cumulative job finding probabilities, by NAICS industry, for workers who were newly 
unemployed during expansion (Aug 2006), recession (Dec 2009), and normal (Jan 2008) periods.  Job finding probabilities 
were estimated from data on unemployed workers in monthly CPS.  In 1.6% of industry/month combinations, the estimated 
marginal job finding probability is negative due to sampling error.  In these cases we use linear interpolation to restrict the 
job finding probability to be positive.  Some 2-digit industries were aggregated to reduce sampling error.  Specifically, 
Agriculture and Natural Resources = 11, 21; Manufacturing = 31-33; Wholesale/Retail Trade = 42, 44, 45; Transportation 
and Utilities = 22, 48, 49; FIRE = Finance and Insurance (52) and Real Estate and Rental and Leasing (53); Business Ser-
vices = 54-56; Education and Health = 61-62; Entertainment and Food = 71-72; and Other Services = 51, 81, 92.     
Sources: authors’ calculations.  
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Table 1: Annual Wage and Welfare Effects of Simulated Layoffs in Northern 
California, per Household (year 2000 US dollars) 
 
Notes: The first row of panel A summarizes the mean unemployment duration for the three scenarios shown in Figure 2.  
The second row reports the wages foregone during the unemployment period for the average worker, net of unemployment 
insurance.  Workers are assumed to collect unemployment insurance at 36% of the old wages.  Row 3 converts the total 
loss to an annuity, using the worker’s expected life years remaining and an interest rate of 7%.  Row 2 of Panel B reports 
the mean change in wage from moving to the worker’s second best job.  Panel C reports the expected equivalent variation, 
taking into account the unemployment spell along with changes in wage and job-house location. The numbers in parenthe-
ses are standard errors.   
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
  
expansion normal recession
Mean unemployment duration (months) 4.60 6.14 9.41
Net wages lost during unemployment period (mean per worker) -15,234 -19,973 -30,815
Annualized net wage loss (mean per worker) -1,231 -1,617 -2,492
Assumption about New Job expansion normal recession
Rehired at identical job in original location 0 0 0
-3,936 -3,936 -3,936
(14,621) (14,621) (14,621)
Assumption about New Job expansion normal recession
Rehired at identical job in original location -1,231 -1,617 -2,492
-7,000 -7,300 -7,949
(12,383) (12,579) (13,146)
 A. TEMPORARY UNEMPLOYMENT
B. CHANGE IN ANNUAL SALARY
 C. EXPECTED EQUIVALENT VARIATION
Move to 2nd best (job, house) location
Move to 2nd best (job, house) location
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Table 2: Wage and Welfare Effects of Layoffs, by Demographic Group (year 
2000 US dollars) 
 
Note: Column 1 reports the wage loss from temporary unemployment, converted to an annuity using each worker’s age and 
life-year tables for the year 2000 from the Center for Disease Control.  The annualized loss reflects an expectation over the 
distribution of unemployment durations corresponding to the job finding probability distribution during “normal” labor 
market conditions.  Column 2 reports the mean change in annual salary when workers move to their second best job loca-
tions.  
 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Annual wage 
loss from 
temporary 
unemployment
Mean change 
in annual 
salary
Expected 
change in real 
wages (i.e., 
(1)+(2))
Expected 
equivalent 
variation
Population -1,617 -3,936 -5,553 -7,300
  
Gender   
women -1,293 -2,398 -3,691 -5,594
men -1,810 -4,845 -6,656 -8,318
Age
under 40 -1,305 -2,821 -4,126 -5,961
40-60 -1,850 -4,908 -6,757 -8,431
over 60 -2,063 -4,313 -6,376 -8,139
Education
less than 13 years -978 -2,377 -3,355 -4,695
13-16 years -1,312 -2,762 -4,075 -5,738
more than 16 years -2,154 -5,550 -7,704 -9,724
Experience
less than 10 years -1,113 -1,701 -2,814 -4,893
10-20 years -1,614 -4,213 -5,827 -7,529
more than 20 years -1,791 -4,538 -6,329 -7,997
Homeownership
renters -1,163 -1,989 -3,151 -5,043
owners -1,909 -5,177 -7,086 -8,748
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Table 3: Wage and Welfare Effects of Layoffs, by Original Job Location  
  
Note: Columns 1 and 2 report the same measures of the expected changes in real wages and EV as in Table 2.  Column 3 
reports the share of workers who are predicted to move to a different housing community after finding a new job in a dif-
ferent PMSA.  Columns 4 through 8 report the share of households experiencing increases in housing prices, air quality, 
school quality, unobserved public goods, and commute times after moving to their new locations.   
Source: authors’ calculations. 
  
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Expected 
change in 
real wages
Expected 
equivalent 
variation
Job Location in 2000
housing 
price
air 
quality
school 
quality
commute 
time
other 
public 
goods
Northern California -5,552 -7,300  0.94  0.27 0.42 0.55 0.59 0.26
Oakland -5,443 -6,706  0.94  0.22 0.31 0.59 0.57 0.24
Sacramento -2,579 -7,450  0.91  0.68 0.83 0.28 0.78 0.67
San Francisco -6,418 -7,544  0.93  0.12 0.20 0.63 0.46 0.15
San Jose -7,348 -8,188  0.96  0.13 0.46 0.58 0.52 0.08
Santa Cruz -6,976 -5,896  1.00  0.17 0.61 0.80 0.78 0.11
Santa Rosa -5,687 -5,850  1.00  0.27 0.30 0.68 0.73 0.27
Vallejo -3,786 -6,130  0.93  0.34 0.31 0.48 0.79 0.37
Yolo -3,649 -6,482  0.90  0.55 0.72 0.57 0.78 0.44
Share experiencing an increase in:Share 
moving to 
different 
community(year 2000 US dollars)
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Appendix Table 1: Wage and Welfare Effects of Layoffs in the Manufacturing 
Sector (year 2000 dollars) 
 
 
Note: See the text and notes to tables 1-3 for definitions of the variables in each column.   
Source: authors’ calculations. 
  
 
Expected 
change in real 
wages 
Expected 
equivalent 
variation
Share of 
manufacturing 
workers
All Manufacturing -7,773 -8,828 1.00
 
Job Location in 2000 Age   
 
under 40 -5,329 -6,283 0.09
over 40 -7,419 -8,445 0.12
under 40 -2,667 -7,953 0.05
over 40 -6,104 -12,290 0.05
under 40 -5,073 -6,565 0.06
over 40 -8,986 -9,447 0.06
under 40 -7,382 -8,092 0.21
over 40 -11,336 -11,132 0.26
under 40 -8,660 -7,050 0.01
over 40 -8,525 -6,535 0.01
under 40 -3,988 -4,191 0.02
over 40 -7,784 -7,677 0.02
under 40 -4,558 -6,124 0.01
over 40 -7,141 -9,019 0.02
under 40 -1,562 -4,568 0.01
over 40 -6,019 -9,530 0.01
Vallejo 
Yolo
Oakland
Sacramento
San Francisco
San Jose
Santa Cruz
Santa Rosa
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Appendix Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis: Adding Moving Costs and Job Offers in 
the Same PMSA for Workers in the Manufacturing Sector 
 
Note: Columns 2 through 4 report the same measures of the expected changes in real wages, EV, and share moving to a 
different community as Table 3.  Column 5 reports the share of workers who are predicted to move to a new job in a differ-
ent PMSA, given that they can find a new job in the same PMSA at the % reduction in wage given in column (1).  Column 
6 reports the net present value of the annualized reduction in wages as a fraction of the worker’s baseline wage, assuming 
that workers under 62 will retire at age 62.  All but the last row include an annualized moving cost of $681.  The last row 
corresponds to the baseline model from Table 3 that assumes free mobility and no job offers in the worker’s original 
PMSA.     
 
Source: authors’ calculations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NPV Δwage 
/ wage
 
3% -3,662 -4,058 0.24 0.20 -0.98
6% -4,742 -5,259 0.52 0.42 -1.21
9% -5,558 -6,141 0.70 0.57 -1.36
12% -6,143 -6,804 0.79 0.68 -1.46
15% -6,563 -7,306 0.84 0.77 -1.52
-- -7,773 -8,828 0.96 1.00 -1.44
% reduction 
in wage at 
2nd best job 
in same 
PMSA
Expected 
change in 
real wages
Expected 
equivalent 
variation
Share 
moving to 
different 
community
Share 
moving to 
job in 
different 
PMSA
